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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the study of durability as an aspect of compe-
tition and market structure that contributes to determining the incentives for
mergers. We find that relative to the incentives in industries that produce non-
durable goods the durability of the good produced by an industry enhances the
incentive for mergers in the presence of intertemporal consistency problems.
Further, the analysis indicates that in durable-good markets a good antitrust
policy should combine a restriction to rent solely with a prudent merger policy.
Keywords: Durable Goods, Mergers, Intertemporal Consistency, Strategic
Behavior.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the relationship between the durability of the good produced
by an oligopolistic industry and the incentives for mergers in the industry. The
interactions that may exist between durability and mergers are important for various
reasons. Durable goods constitute a very important part of economic production.
In 2006, for instance, personal consumption expenditures on durables exceeded 1
trillion dollars in the U.S., and in the manufacturing sector durable goods production
constituted roughly 60 percent of aggregate production. Mergers, on the other hand,
have also been the subject of keen interest in an important theoretical and empirical
literature in industrial organization. Also, as noted in Pesendorfer (2003), mergers
and acquisitions have long been a public policy concern. In the United States, Section
7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers that “substantially decrease competition or
tend to create a monopoly.” In recent years, the volume of mergers and acquisitions
in U.S. industries has increased substantially, reaching an unprecedented number
of 47,492 premerger notifications received by antitrust regulators during the decade
1997-2006. Given the importance of durable goods in aggregate production, it is no
surprise that many of these mergers involved durable goods firms. These reasons
provide initial motivation for the analysis in this paper.
The literature on mergers has studied a number of relevant aspects including short
run price and output eﬀects, welfare and long-run eﬀects, the impact on research
and development and shareholder wealth, investment decisions, and others.1 From
the theoretical perspective, however, it is not clear when mergers are likely to take
place. In a non-durable good setting, Kamien and Zang (1990) study the limits of
monopolization through acquisition in the absence of any legal barriers but in the
presence of firms fully aware of the consequences of acquiring or being acquired by
rivals, not susceptible to incredible threats, and behaving strategically with respect
to this activity. One of the results they find is that neither complete monopolization
nor partial monopolization can be a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome as
the number of firms in the industry becomes suﬃciently large. Only when the number
1See, for example, Spector (2003), Pesendorfer (2003), Waldman (2007) and other references
therein.
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of firms is suﬃciently small is complete or partial monopolization possible. To the
best of our knowledge, in a durable goods setting no similar analysis exists in the
literature.
Besides the fact that durable goods constitute an important part of production
and that many durable goods industries are highly concentrated,2 an additional moti-
vation to study the feasibility and implications of mergers in durable goods industries
is that they have been viewed as not posing a threat of significant anti-competitive
harm. For instance, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (section 3.2) of the United
States Department of Justice (1997) indicates that “Where the relevant product is
a durable good, consumers, in response to a significant commitment to entry, may
defer purchases by making additional investments to extend the useful life of previ-
ously purchased goods and in this way deter or counteract for a time the competitive
eﬀects of concern.”
Also, Carlton and Gertner (1989) note that there are a number of reasons why
durable goods industries may be more competitive than non-durable goods indus-
tries and why it is diﬃcult to create market power through mergers in durable goods
industries. One reason is that the stock of durable goods may limit the increase in
prices of the new units produced after the merger. Obviously, the eﬀectiveness of
this constraint depends on the specific circumstances of the industry. For example,
the 1997 case of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger in commercial aircraft may
be quite diﬀerent from mergers among firms that produce agricultural equipment.
The reason is that there is much greater scope for more intensive use in agricultural
equipment than in the case of aircraft, and hence there is greater potential for the ex-
isting stock of used machines to act as a constraint on the behavior of new equipment
manufacturers.3 A second reason is the possibility of dynamic strategic interactions
among rivals. These interactions may induce an oligopolist to choose to sell some
of its output rather than rent it. Selling production in turn induces more competi-
tive behavior than renting production. Either of these two eﬀects may alleviate any
detrimental eﬀects of mergers.
A number of recent papers have been concerned with the eﬀects of mergers in
durable-good industries (see for instance Gerstle and Waldman 2004, Waldman 2007,
2As indicated by Driskill (2001) and others, most durable good producers appear to have market
power. For example, 90 percent of major household appliances are produced by just five companies.
3For a detailed analysis of the circumstances that may make the stock of durable goods constrain
new durable good prices, see Lexecon (2000).
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and other references therein). These works study the robustness of the conclusions
of the classic paper of Carlton and Gertner. For example, following the analysis of
Carlon and Gertner, Gerstle and Waldman analyze the eﬀects of mergers in durable-
goods industries, considering an industry that is perfectly competitive prior to the
merger, becomes monopolistic after the merger, and again is competitive after the
subsequent entry of new firms. The key aspect is that they depart from the Swan-type
model of durability used by Carlton and Gertner. Instead, they consider that there is
no number of used units that could ever serve as a perfect substitute for a new unit. In
their setting the authors find that (i) the welfare loss due to monopoly is larger than
that indicated by the previous literature, and that (ii) the reduction in social welfare
loss due to durability depends critically on the speed of future entry, and hence this
speed should be an important determinant of whether or not durable-goods mergers
may be allowed.
In this paper we address a question that is concerned with the endogeneity of
mergers in durable good industries but that has not been considered in the literature,
namely to what extent the incentives for merging are diﬀerent between durable and
non-durable goods industries. We then study the implications of these diﬀerences
in incentives. In anticipation of the results, we find that both the possibility of
strategic interactions among rivals pointed out by Carlton and Gertner and the classic
expectations problem associated with durable goods first identified by Coase (1972)
enhance the incentives to merge.4 We argue that this result is relevant in the context
of a literature that studies the diﬀerent aspects of competition and market structure
as a determinant of the incentives for mergers.5
A standard result in the literature on the durable goods monopoly (e.g., Bulow
4Coase conjectured that if consumers have perfect information and are rational, then a monopoly
seller of an infinitelly durable good without some commitment to limit future production would
saturate the market with the competitive ouput “in the twinkling of an eye” (p. 143).
5Salant et al. (1983) consider a model of Cournot competition and show that some exogenous
change in market structure (exogenous mergers) may reduce the joint profits of the firms that collude.
Considering linear demand and costs they show that in order for a merger to be profitable the number
of firms that merge must be at least equal to 80 percent of the industry. Given the empirical
evidence on mergers in diﬀerent industries, this result has motivated the analysis of diﬀerent aspects
of competition that may explain the incentives for merger. In particular, it has been shown that
the profitability of a merger is enhanced when, for instance, firms compete in prices (Deneckere and
Davidson 1985), the capital stock aﬀects the marginal cost of production (Perry and Porter 1985),
or when the principal delegates production decisions to managers (Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-
Cun˜at 2001, Ziss 2001). Fauli-Oller (2001) shows in a Cournot model that profitability of mergers
is inversely related to the degree of concavity of demand.
4
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1982, Kahn 1986) shows that when (i) the inverse rental demand for the good is linear
and (ii) the firm may only choose the level of production, social welfare is greater
if the monopoly sells its output instead of renting it. In practice, firms such as the
United Shoe Company, IBM, Xerox and others began by renting their products but
were later required also to sell their output. This paper shows that in the abscence of
mergers, under assumptions (i) and (ii), social welfare is higher and consumer surplus
is lower when renting is allowed than when it is forbidden. This result arises because
of the strategic interactions among rivals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the frame-
work of analysis. We assume that mergers take place through an acquisition process
where the owner of each firm makes bids to buy other firms and sets an asking price
for his own firm. In particular, we consider the centralized model of Kamien and
Zang, which is extended to allow for durability. Durability is modeled following the
classic approach in Bulow (1982). In this framework we then compare the feasibility
of endogenous mergers in the following three cases: (i) Renting firms, where firms rent
the good in question, (ii) Selling firms, where firms cannot rent but must sell their
production, and (iii) Renting-Selling firms where they may both rent and sell their
production. In Section 3 we compute and compare the social welfare and consumer
surplus in each of these three cases. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We consider an oligopolistic industry with N ≥ 2 identical firms that produce a
homogeneous durable good. Entry into the industry is assumed to be unprofitable.
In order to analyze the implications that durability of the good produced by the
industry and the inability of firms to commit to a future schedule of production may
have for mergers, the analysis is implemented in an intertemporal context. There are
two discrete periods of time t = 1, 2, and the good does not depreciate over time.
Thus, every quantity used in the first period can be used in the second period without
depreciation. All agents have perfect and complete information and potential buyers
of the durable good have perfect foresight. Without loss of generality we assume that
the discount factor is 1. The inverse rental demand function for the durable good in
each period is P = a − bQ, where Q represents the quantity used by consumers in
that period. The marginal cost of production of each firm is zero, and there exits a
5
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perfect second hand market for the durable good.
The analysis is modeled as a non-cooperative game that consists of two stages.
In the first stage firms engage in a centralized game of acquisition, which means that
an owner that acquires several firms behaves as one entity. Given the assumption of
zero marginal cost of production, the owner would be indiﬀerent between producing
in only one of his firms or distributing production among all of the firms that he
owns. For simplicity we will assume that the owner will operate in just one of them.
In the second stage, active firms resulting from the merger game engage in quantity
competition.
Note that this model can be considered as an extension of the monopolistic case
considered by Bulow to the oligopolistic case by simply adding the previous acquisi-
tion stage. This model can also be considered as an extension of the model analyzed by
Kamien and Zang to the durable goods case by incorporating Coase’s time-consistency
problem and the strategic interactions among durable good producers.
The solution concept is that of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. Therefore, the solution is derived by backward induction from the last stage.
As we shall see, given N , multiple structures of the industry may be supported as a
subgame perfect equilibrium. In those cases, we will select the one that is eﬃcient
from the firms’ point of view, that is, the one where there is no other structure that
can be supported as subgame perfect equilibrium in which each firm obtains at least
as many profits as in the one selected. The following notation will be used:
qs1i: quantity sold by firm i in the first period,
qr1i: quantity rented by firm i in the first period,
q2i: quantity sold (or rented) by firm i in the second period,
6
qs1: quantity sold by the industry in the first period,
qr1: quantity rented by the industry in the first period,
q2: quantity sold by the industry in the second period,
m: total number of active firms in the industry after the acquisition process.
We now proceed to the resolution of the intertemporal model, first when firms
may only rent their output (renting firms); second, when they may only sell their
output (selling firms); and lastly when they may both sell and rent their production
(renting-selling firms).
6Given that the second period is the last one, renting is identical to selling in that period. Hence,
no distinction needs to be made.
6
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2.1 Renting Firms
Every initial owner maximizes his payoﬀ, given by his operating profits, less the
payments he makes for the firms he purchased, plus the payment he receives for his
own firm if it is sold. The problem is solved beginning from the second stage of the
game.
Second Stage:
After the acquisition process, each active firm will choose the quantity to be
produced in periods 1 and 2 in order to maximize the discounted value of its total
profits. Thus, each firm i, i = 1, ...,m, solves
max
{qr1i,q2i}
(a− bqr1)qr1i + (a− bq2)q2i.
The first order conditions of this problem are
a− bqr1 − bqr1i = 0,
a− bq2 − bq2i = 0.
Hence, in equilibrium,
qr1 = q2 =
am
b(m+ 1)
.
As a result, the present discounted value of the total profits derived from produc-
tion for each of the m active firms in the industry, π(m), is
π(m) = 2a
2
b(m+ 1)2
. (1)
Clearly, π(m) is decreasing in the number of active firms. This is a general
property that will hold in each and every situation that will later be analyzed in this
paper.
As various authors have noted, the solution of the above maximization problem
is dynamically inconsistent unless firms rent their output or, alternatively, if they
sell it but can precommit to current buyers that the value of their stock of durable
goods will be taken into account in future production.7 Precommitment is possible,
7Bulow (1982) oﬀers examples of markets in which renting is not feasible. For example, durable
intermediate products must be sold and not rented. In our analysis, we will not diﬀerentiate between
the diﬀerent possible situations in which the solution given in this subsection is dynamically consis-
tent, for instance between the situation in which the good in question is rented and the situation in
which the good is sold but firms precommit by oﬀering best-price provisions. We will just refer to
them as the case of renting firms or as the case in which firms coordinate to rent their output.
7
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for example, by oﬀering best-price provisions (Butz 1990), a practice that has been
used extensively, for instance, in the electric turbo generating industry and others
(see Goering and Boyce 1999).8
We analyze next the first stage of the game.
First stage:
Kamien and Zang examine the feasibility of mergers in an homogeneous good
Cournot oligopoly. Their analysis contains the description of our first stage. More
details may be found in their paper.
If an owner has k ≥ 2 firms in a subgame perfect equilibrium in which there are
m active firms, then his payoﬀ must be greater than the payoﬀ he would obtain if he
did not buy any other firm, taking into account that he must pay for any acquired
firm at least π(m+ 1). Therefore, in equilibrium the following inequality must hold:
D(m,k) = π(m)− (k − 1)π(m+ 1)− π(m+ k − 1) ≥ 0. (2)
We define a merged subgame perfect equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium
in which at least one owner owns more than one firm. In this kind of game, for a
given N , there are subgame perfect equilibria in which m = N . Following Kamien
and Zang, we will call them unmerged subgame perfect equilibria. Note that, given
N , every merged subgame perfect equilibrium will dominate the unmerged subgame
perfect equilibria since the profits for a firm are decreasing in the number of active
firms and in a merged equilibrium m < N .
With regard to the structure of the industry resulting from the acquisition game in
the case of renting firms, if we take into account (1), condition (2), and the refinement
procedure described above, the following proposition can be established:
Proposition 1. If firms producing a durable good can commit to renting their
production, then the structure of the industry resulting from the acquisition game is
such that
(i). m = N if N > 2,
(ii). if N = 2 then m = 1.
Proof : Let us now consider the feasibility of merged subgame perfect equilibria.
From (1), we have that
8For example, General Electric and Westinghouse used best price guarantees during the period
1963-1977.
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D(m,k) =
2a2
b(m+ 1)2
− (k − 1) 2a
2
b(m+ 2)2
− 2a
2
b(m+ k)2
=
=
−2a2(k − 1)A(m, k)
b.(m+ 1)2(m+ 2)2(m+ k)2
.
Given that ∂A(m,k)∂k > 0 for all k > 1, A(m, 2) > 0 for all m > 1, A(1, 3) > 0, and
A(1, 2) < 0, we may conclude that D(m,k) > 0 if and only if m = 1 and k = 2. As a
result, from (2), the only feasible merged subgame perfect equilibrium is a monopoly
if N = 2. In addition, there is at least one set of bids and asking prices that supports
the monopoly structure as a subgame perfect equilibrium. An example of such set is
the following: the asking price set by firm 2, π(2), is equal to the bid set by firm 1,
the bid set by firm 2 is zero, and the asking price set by firm 1 is π(1). The payoﬀs
for owners of firms 1 and 2 will be π(1)− π(2) and π(2) respectively, and obviously
no owner has an incentive to change his bid or asking price.
The analysis by Kamien and Zang implies that with a linear demand function for
a non-durable good and constant returns to scale, there are no mergers in equilibrium
with more than two initial firms if they compete a` la Cournot. Thus, Proposition
1 implies that when a durable goods industry rents its output, the structure of the
industry after the acquisition process is identical to the one corresponding to a non-
durable goods industry. The intuition behind this result is that in our context,
given the demand function for the services of the durable good, the quantity rented
each period by a durable goods industry coincides with the quantity produced by a
non-durable good industry with the same number of active firms, m. As a result,
π(m) is equal to the profits that would be obtained by each of the firms in the
repeated Cournot game that arises with non-durable goods. Therefore D(m, k) > 0
for the durable goods industry iﬀ D(m,k) > 0 for the non-durable goods industry.9
Therefore, the comparison of the results concerning the feasibility of merged subgame
perfect equilibria in the other two cases to be studied in the paper (selling firms and
renting-selling firms) with those corresponding to renting firms is identical to the
comparison with the results corresponding to the case of a non-durable good industry.
9If firms have constant and positive marginal cost of production, then the quantity rented each
period coincides with the quantity produced by a non-durable good industry with identical technol-
ogy that faces, instead, the inverse demand function P = α− βQ with α = 2a and β = 2b. Hence,
as expected, the result in Proposition 1 applies.
9
Page 10 of 23
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Next we study the case of firms that have no commitment ability, that is firms
that cannot rent their output.
2.2 Selling Firms
In an oligopoly model in which firms do not have commitment ability, durability in-
troduces the same complexities concerning the interplay between consumer expecta-
tions and the time-consistent behavior of the producer that are present in the classic
durable-goods monopoly problem. Each period selling firms maximize the present
discounted value of profits starting from that period. Thus, in order to calculate the
intertemporal consistent schedule of production that maximizes the discounted value
of profits for firm i, the maximization problem has to be resolved recursively by back-
ward induction: first we need to determine the optimal production for period t = 2,
given any production in period t = 1, and then calculate the optimal production
corresponding to period 1. At t = 2, each firm sells the quantity that maximizes its
profits corresponding to the second period, given the quantity sold in the first period.
Hence, firm i, i = 1, ...,m, will solve the following problem:
max
q2i
(a− bq2 − bqs1)q2i
subject to q2i ≥ 0. The first order conditions of these i = 1, ...,m problems imply
q2 =
ma− bmqs1
b(m+ 1)
.
Note that the cumulative quantity sold by the industry, q2 + q
s
1, increases with
the quantity sold in the first period. Hence, the sale price corresponding to the
second period, which coincides with the rental price of that period, decreases with
the quantity sold in the first period.
In the first period, each firm sells the quantity that maximizes the present value
of its total profits taking into account that the production at t = 2 depends on the
production at t = 1. In equilibrium, since the good is durable and does not depreciate
over time, the sale price of the good at t = 1 is equal to the sum of the rental prices
corresponding to periods 1 and 2. Hence, at t = 1 each firm i solves the following
problem:
max
qs1i
(a− bqs1)qs1i + (a− bq2 − bqs1)(q2i + qs1i)
10
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subject to
q2i =
a− bqs1
b(m+ 1)
≥ 0.
Assuming interior solutions, the first order conditions are
m(m+ 3)a− bm(m+ 3)qs1 − b(m2 + 3m+ 2)qs1i = 0, i = 1, ...,m.
Adding up these m conditions we get
qs1 =
m2(m+ 3)a
b(m3 + 4m2 + 3m+ 2)
; q2 =
m(m+ 2)a
b(m3 + 4m2 + 3m+ 2)
.
Therefore, the present value of the total profits of each firm i is equal to
π(m) = (2 +m)
2(m2 + 3m+ 1)a2
b(m3 + 4m2 + 3m+ 2)2
. (3)
Let us now consider the first stage of the game. As in the case of renting firms
we have that for every N there is an unmerged subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus,
we must analyze the feasibility of merged subgame perfect equilibria. With regard to
the structure of the industry resulting from the acquisition game when firms do not
have any commitment ability, from (3) and condition (2), the following proposition
can be established:
Proposition 2. If firms sell their output and the marginal cost of production
is zero, then the structure of the industry resulting from the acquisition game when
firms do not have any commitment ability is such that
(i). m = N if N > 3,
(ii). m = 1 if N = 2, or N = 3.
Proof : Taking into account (3) we obtain
D(m, k) =
(2 +m)2(m2 + 3m+ 1)a2
b(m3 + 4m2 + 3m+ 2)2
− (k − 1) (3 +m)
2(m2 + 5m+ 5)a2
b(m3 + 7m2 + 14m+ 10)2
−
−(1 +m+ k)
2(m2 + k2 + 2mk +m+ k − 1)a2
b((m+ k − 1)(m+ k)(m+ k + 2) + 2)2 = −
a2 · (k − 1) · C(m, k)
b · F (m, k) ,
where F (m,k) > 0, ∂C(m,k)∂k > 0 for all k ≥ 3, C(m, 3) > 0 for all m ≥ 2, C(m, 2) > 0
for allm ≥ 2, and C(1, 4) > 0.10 Thus, it is straightforward to show that D(m, k) > 0
10Proofs are available from the authors upon request.
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if and only if m = 1 and 2 ≤ k ≤ 3. In addition, the following set of bids and asking
prices supports those structures of acquisitions as subgame perfect equilibria: the
bids (or bid) set for firm 1 coincide(s) with the asking prices (price) set by the rest
of the firms, π(2). The asking price set by firm 1 is high enough, π(1), and the bids
set by firms other than firm 1 are low enough, for instance zero.
A simple comparison of Propositions 1 and 2 allows us to conclude that mergers
are more likely to take place in a selling durable-goods industry than in a renting
industry: a monopoly is obtained as a result of the acquisition game for N ∈ {2, 3}
rather than for just N = 2. The intuitive explanation of this result may be given in
terms of the slope of a single firm’s reaction curve in period 1 in both contexts.11 A
greater slope implies that outsiders will react less aggressively to the merger, and as a
result mergers become more profitable. From the first order condition corresponding
to the maximization problem solved by firm i in t =1, we obtain that the slope of a
single firm’s reaction curve is equal to - m(3+m)
2+2m(3+m)
for the case of selling firms and −1
2
for the case of renting firms. Given that - m(3+m)
2+2m(3+m)
>-1
2
, it is immediate to conclude
that outsiders will react less aggressively to the merger in the case of selling firms
that in the case of renting firms. The reason is that in the first case an increase in
the production in period 1 induces a reduction in the residual demand corresponding
to the second period.
In the analysis we have assumed that the marginal cost of production is zero and
that the discount factor is equal to one. It is important to discuss the role that these
two simplifying assumptions play. On one hand, it is not diﬃcult to show that if the
marginal cost of production is independent of the level of production and suﬃciently
high relative to a (in particular, greater than a
2
) then, givenm, the level of production
and the profits of each firm would be identical to the ones corresponding to the rental
case. As shown earlier, in this case the only merged subgame perfect equilibrium
is a monopoly if N = 2. On the other hand, we have that it is precisely when the
future is important enough, that is, when the discount factor is high enough, that the
intertemporal consistency problem is more relevant. Obviously, in the extreme case
in which the discount factor is zero there is no such a problem and the analysis is
identical to the one corresponding to the non-durable goods case: the only one merged
subgame perfect equilibrium is a monopoly if N = 2. In fact, it is not diﬃcult to
11We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this observation.
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show that with selling firms and zero marginal cost of production a monopoly is a
subgame perfect equilibrium when N = 3 if and only if the discount factor v is high
enough (more precisely, iﬀ v > 0.65).
Lastly, we consider the case in which firms may both rent and sell their outputs
but they do not coordinate to rent them.
2.3 Renting-Selling Firms
If firms can rent and sell their outputs, then in equilibrium each firm will sell part
of its production even though its profits would be greater if all of them coordinated
to rent their production (Carlton and Gertner) since a firm selling a durable good
today is stealing sales from its rivals both today and tomorrow. Therefore, given that
consumers have perfect foresight, the problem involves both the dynamic reactions
among oligopolists and the time-consistency problem identified by Coase. The set up
of the model in this section corresponds to the analysis of Carlton and Gertner assum-
ing that there is no depreciation. Following their analysis, the industry production
levels are
qs1 =
am(m− 1)
b(m2 + 1)
; qr1 =
2am
b(m+ 1)(m2 + 1)
and q2 =
am
b(m2 + 1)
.
Details of the resolution may be found in their paper. Taking into account the in-
dustry production levels and that firms are identical, it is straightforward to conclude
that the present value of total profits for firm i, i = 1, ...,m, is
π(m) = a
2(m4 +m3 + 4m2 +m+ 1)
b(m+ 1)2(m2 + 1)2
. (4)
With regard to the merged subgame perfect equilibria for renting-selling firms,
using this expression and condition (2) the following proposition can be established:
Proposition 3a. If in equilibrium firms rent and sell output then the merged
subgame perfect equilibria are
(i). a monopoly if N ∈ {2, 3},
(ii). a duopoly if N ∈ {3, 4}.
Proof : Taking into account (4), we get that
D(m,k) =
a2(m4 +m3 + 4m2 +m+ 1)
b(m+ 1)2(m2 + 1)2
−(k−1)a
2(m4 + 5m3 + 13m2 + 16m+ 8)
b(m+ 2)2(m2 + 2m+ 2)2
−
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a2((m+ k − 1)4 + (m+ k − 1)3 + 4(m+ k − 1)2 +m+ k)
b(m+ k)2(m2 + k2 + 2mk − 2m− 2k + 2)2 = −
a2(k − 1)G(m,k)
bH(m,k)
,
where H(m,k) > 0, ∂G(m,k)∂k > 0 for all m,k such that m ≥ 2 and k ≥ 2, G(2, 3) > 0,
G(m, 2) > 0 for all m ≥ 3 and G(1, 4) > 0.
Thus, it is straightforward to show that D(m, k) > 0 if and only if either m = 1
and k ∈ {2, 3}, or m = 2 and k = 2. Notice that D(2, 2) > 0 implies that if either
N = 3 or N = 4, then a duopoly is a feasible merged subgame perfect equilibrium.
The set of bids and asking prices given in the proof of Proposition 2 support the
structure of acquisitions necessary to have a monopoly for N = {2, 3} as subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Lastly, for N = 3 or N = 4 the following set of bids and asking prices supports the
structures of acquisitions that induce the industry to become a duopoly as a subgame
perfect equilibrium: the bid set by every firm that acquires another firm coincides
with the asking price set by the acquired firm and it is equal to π(3); the rest of the
bids are suﬃciently low, say zero, and the rest of asking prices are suﬃciently high,
say π(1).
It is not diﬃcult to show that the results in Proposition 3a are maintained for
constant marginal costs of production that are low relative to a and for discount
factors that are suﬃciently high (in particular, for v > 0.69).
From Proposition 3a we may establish the following result with regard to the final
structure of the industry after the acquisition process.
Proposition 3b. The structure resulting from the acquisition game with renting-
selling firms is such that
(i). m = N if N > 4,
(ii). m = 2 if N = 4,
(iii). m = 1 if N = 2, or N = 3.
Proof : From Proposition 3a it is straightforward to show that parts (i), (ii) and
(iv) hold true. Thus, we only need to show that if N = 3, then the structure m = 2
is dominated by the structure m = 1. Let us denote by πi the profits of the owner of
firm i. Given that for m = 2, π3 is at most equal to π(2)− π(3), whereas for m = 1,
π3 is at least as high as π(2), it is clear that the structurem = 1 cannot be dominated
by the structure m = 2.
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We analyze now whether the structure m = 2 can be dominated by the struc-
ture m = 1. Consider those equilibria in which an owner who acquires a firm
pays for it a quantity equal to π(m + 1). From (5) we get that if m = 1, then
π1 = π(1)− 2π(2) = 53a
2
450b
and πi = π(2) = 43a
2
225b
with i = 2, 3, whereas if m = 2, then
π1 = π(2)− π(3) = 71a
2
720b
, π2 = π(2) = 43a
2
225b
and π3 = π(3) = 37a
2
400b
. Just comparing the
profits of each firm in these cases, we obtain that the structure m = 1 dominates the
structure m = 2. Therefore, (iii) also holds true.
Comparing Propositions 1, 2 and 3b we may conclude that the incentives for
mergers are highest in the presence of renting-selling firms. In order to understand
why this is the case, it is important to note that in the absence of marginal production
costs, rental production has no eﬀect on future competition. In fact, the restriction
given by the behavior of firms in t = 2 implies, as in the case of selling firms, that
q2i =
a−bqs1
b(m+1)
. That is, the quantity sold by the industry in the second period depends
only on the quantity sold in period 1. The first order conditions corresponding to the
maximization problem solved by firm i, i = 1, ...,m, in t = 1 are
a− bqs1− bqr1− bqs1i− bqr1i = 0 and
m(m+ 3)
(m+ 1)2
(a− bqs1)− b(qr1+ qr1i)−
(m+ 2)
(m+ 1)2
bqs1i = 0.
From the first condition we know that b(qr1 + q
r
1i) = a− bqs1 − bqs1i. By replacing it in
the second equation, we may express the conditions as follows:
a−b(qs1+qr1)−b(qs1i+qr1i) = 0 and (m−1)a−(m−1)bqs1−(m+1)bqs1i = 0, i = 1, ...,m.
Hence, the slope of a single firm’s reaction curve in period 1 is equal to -1
2
, as in the
case of renting firms. Note, however, that the level of sales for firm i in period 1
depends only on the level of sales of the rest of firms in that period. Moreover, the
slope of the function that captures this dependence is equal to -m−1
2m
, which is greater
than the slope in the case of selling firms, - m(3+m)
2+2m(3+m)
. Hence, when the sales of the
other firms in period 1 decrease, firm i reacts by increasing in that period both the
quantities rented and sold. As a result the increase of the quantity sold in period 1
is lower than the corresponding to the case of selling firms. Therefore, firms behave
less aggressively than in the case of selling firms since it is only the level of sales in
period 1 that has an eﬀect on future competition.
Lastly, a simple comparison of Propositions 1, 2 and 3b allows us to establish the
main result of the paper.
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Proposition 4. If the good produced by the industry is durable, then complete
monopolization and partial monopolization are more likely to take place in the pres-
ence of the time-consistency problems induced by durability.
As discussed throughout the paper, the presence of time-consistency problems
implies that mergers are more likely to take place in durable goods industries than
in non-durable goods industries.12 Given these diﬀerences, in order to analyze the
eﬀects of the diﬀerent practices (renting or selling) on social welfare and consumer
surplus, it is important to take into account the incentives to merge. We study this
aspect next.
3 Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare
The literature on durable goods industries has studied a number of diﬀerent issues
(e.g., the determinants of planned obsolescence, social welfare, etc.) assuming that
firms can either rent or sell their production but not both (see, for example, Bulow
1986, Kahn 1986, Goering 1992, Driskill 2001, and other references therein). As
indicated by Bulow (1982), renting may often be ruled out for legal reasons. For ex-
ample, United Shoe Company, IBM, and Xerox began by only renting their products
but were later required at some point to also sell them. The results in the previous
section indicate that it is precisely in this situation when mergers in durable goods
industries are more likely to take place. Given that in the context considered in this
paper firms are symmetric and there are no economies of scale or fixed costs, a merger
will induce a welfare loss. Also, from the analysis above it may be concluded that a
regulatory constraint that establishes that the share of the firms that participate in
the merger must be lower than 50% will imply that the game does not have a merged
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. These aspects raise the question of what the net
eﬀects are on social welfare of the diﬀerent practices (renting or selling) both when
we take and when we do not take into account the incentives to merge.
In what follows social welfare will be measured as the sum in present value of
firms’ profits and consumer surplus. From Section 2, we know that a necessary
condition for a merged subgame perfect equilibrium to exist in at least one of the
three possible situations considered (renting, selling, renting-selling firms) is that the
12It is not diﬃcult to show that the result in Proposition 4 also applies to the case of exogenous
mergers.
16
Page 17 of 23
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
number of firms in the industry is at most four (i.e., N ≤ 4). In this section we will
first compare consumer surplus and social welfare in each of these situations in the
cases where there is no merged subgame perfect equilibrium and as a result m = N .
Then, for N ≤ 4 we will analyze the eﬀects on consumer surplus and social welfare
that arise from the interplay between the diﬀerent practices (renting or selling) and
the incentives to merge.
3.1 Social Welfare When There Are No Merged Subgame
Perfect Equilibria
Given that the cost of production is zero, it follows that both social welfare and con-
sumer surplus increase with the quantity of goods used by consumers each period.13
The quantity used in the market each period t, Qjt , where j = r, s, r − s denotes the
cases of renting firms, selling firms, and renting-selling firms respectively, is such that
a. On one hand, we have Qr−s1 (m) = Q
r
1(m) and Q
r
2(m) < Q
r−s
2 (m). As result
of the strategic eﬀects that exist in the renting-selling oligopoly industry, we have
behavior being more competitive than in the renting firms oligopoly industry or,
equivalently, than in the repeated Cournot game that arises with non-durable goods.
Thus, given m, social welfare and consumer surplus are greater in the case of renting-
selling firms than in the renting case. The incentive to sell arises solely for strategic
reasons and tends to cause both the price and the deadweight loss to be lower than
what they would be in the case of r nting firms.
b. On the other hand, we have that Qr−s1 (m) > Q
s
1(m) and Q
r−s
2 (m) < Q
s
2(m).
Due to the time-consistency problem, selling firms produce in the first period a quan-
tity that is lower than that produced by renting or renting-selling firms. The reason
is that this is the only commitment mechanism that firms have for not flooding the
market in the second period. Otherwise, since consumers are rational, flooding the
market would imply a decrease in the prices at which the good is sold in each of the
periods.
In general, given a number of active firms m, social welfare W (m) and consumer
surplus CS(m) may be written as
13The quantity used in the second period will be equal to the sum of the quantities sold each
period. The quantity used in the first period will be equal to the sum of the quantity sold and the
quantity rented in that period.
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W (m) =
Z qs1(m)+qr1(m)
0
(a− bQ)dQ+
Z qs1(m)+q2(m)
0
(a− bQ)dQ,
CS(m) =
b
2
[(qs1(m) + q
r
1(m))
2 + (qs1(m) + q2(m))
2].
Hence, from the analysis in Section 2 it is straightforward to conclude that social
welfare W j(m) and consumer surplus CSj(m) in each of the three cases considered,
j = r, s, r − s, are
W r(m) =
a2m(2 +m)
b(m+ 1)2
,
CSr(m) =
m2a2
b(m+ 1)2
;
W s(m) =
a2m(2m5 + 16m4 + 43m3 + 50m2 + 36m+ 8)
2b(m3 + 4m2 + 3m+ 2)2
;
CSs(m) =
a2m2(2m4 + 14m3 + 29m2 + 16m+ 4)
2b(m3 + 4m2 + 3m+ 2)2
;
W r−s(m) =
a2m(2m5 + 4m4 + 5m3 + 8m2 + 3m+ 2)
2b(m2 + 1)2(m+ 1)2
;
CSr−s(m) =
m2a2(2m4 + 2m3 + 3m2 + 1)
2b(m2 + 1)2(m+ 1)2
.
As a result,
W r−s(m) > W s(m) > W r(m) and CSs(m) > CSr−s(m) > CSr(m) for all m > 1,
whereas
W s(1) > W r−s(1) =W r(1) and CSs(1) > CSr−s(1) = CSr(1).
Hence, if there is no merged subgame perfect equilibria and firms cannot coordi-
nate to rent all of their production, then it is optimal, from the social point of view,
that renting output is allowed. However, this is not optimal from the consumers’
point of view. Note that only for the case of monopoly do we obtain that social
welfare maximization implies that renting should be forbidden.
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As shown earlier, in the absence of prohibitions imposed by the antitrust authorities
the incentives to merge are diﬀerent depending on whether we have renting, selling,
or renting-selling firms. We next compare social welfare, consumer surplus, and the
welfare loss due to mergers for these three cases when there are merged subgame
perfect equilibria.
3.2 Incentives to Merge and Social Welfare
Merged subgame perfect equilibria are feasible only if N ≤ 4. We next analyze and
compare social welfare and consumer surplus under the diﬀerent practices of the firms
in each of the three initial structures of the industry in which there is some merged
subgame perfect equilibrium.
(i) If N = 2, we know that in every situation there is one merged subgame perfect
equilibrium that is a monopoly. From the analysis above, we know that
W s(1) > W r−s(1) =W r(1) and CSs(1) > CSr−s(1) = CSr(1).
Hence, in this situation it would be optimal from both the social welfare and the
consumer surplus points of view not to allow firms to rent.
(ii) If N = 3, there are merged subgame perfect equilibria only when firms sell
their production either totally or partially (see Propositions 1, 2 and 3b). In both of
these cases the result of the acquisition problem would be complete monopolization:
m = 1. As a result, on one hand social welfare and consumer surplus are greater
in the case of selling firms; on the other hand, with renting firms we have m = 3,
and therefore by comparing social welfare and consumer surplus for renting firms and
selling firms, we may conclude that
W r(m = 3)−W s(m = 1) = 15a
2
16b
− 155a
2
200b
> 0,
and
CSr(3)− CSs(1) = 9a
2
16b
− 13a
2
40b
> 0.
Hence, it would be optimal from the viewpoints of social welfare and consumer surplus
not to allow firms to sell their output because of the incentives they have to merge.
(iii) If N = 4, then the only merged subgame perfect equilibrium corresponds to
the case of renting-selling firms. Such equilibrium is a duopoly. If firms are either
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renting or selling, then there would be 4 active firms in the industry. As a result we
have that
W r(4)−W r−s(2) = 24a
2
25b
− 208a
2
225b
> 0,
and
CSr(4)− CSr−s(2) = 16a
2
25b
− 122a
2
225b
> 0.
Therefore, if firms are allowed to rent their production because of the incentives to
merge, it would be then desirable from the viewpoint of social welfare, and even from
the consumers’ viewpoint, that they coordinate to rent it. However, since W s(m) >
W r(m) ∀m, the appropriate prescription would be to forbid renting the good.
The results obtained thus far suggest that it is important to analyze whether
mergers in durable-goods industries potentially pose as many problems as in non-
durable good markets. Put diﬀerently, a relevant question is whether mergers in
durable-goods industries may be posing a threat of significant anticompetitive harm.
In a context with two periods of time and where the demand for the services of the
good does not change over time, the comparison of the welfare loss due to merging
in the cases of selling and renting-selling firms with the welfare loss corresponding to
the case of renting firms is identical to the comparison with respect to the case of a
non-durable good industry. The reasons are that there are no costs of production and
that, as shown ealier, the quantity rented each period by a durable goods industry
coincides with the quantity produced each period by a non-durable good industry with
the same number of active firms. Taking into account the expressions corresponding
to social welfare W j(m) obtained in section 3.1, it is straightforward to conclude
that the welfare loss, in percentage terms, due to mergers is not lower in the case of
durable goods than in the case of non-durable goods. More precisely, we have that
for N = 2 the welfare loss of merging, WLj, is WLr = 15.62% , WLs = 15.93% and
WLr−s = 18.87%; for N = 3 we have WLr = 0 since in this case (renting firms)
there are no mergers , WLs = 19.37% and WLr−s = 22.17%, and for N = 4 we have
WLr =WLs = 0 since there are no mergers in these cases, and WLr−s = 5.5%.
In conclusion, the analysis in this section suggests that in durable-good markets
a good antitrust policy should combine a restriction to rent solely with a prudent
merger policy.
20
Page 21 of 23
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
4 Conclusions
We have analyzed the eﬀects of durability on the incentives to merge. These eﬀects
have relevant implications for the literature on mergers and for the analysis of the
eﬀects on social welfare and consumer surplus of the diﬀerent practices used in the
commercialization of durable goods. Our main conclusion is that, relative to the case
of non-durable goods, Coase’s intertemporal consistency problem and the strategic
interactions among firms in a durable good industry enhance the incentives for merg-
ers.
Durable goods occupy a prominent role in aggregate economic production in the
US and other developed countries, and mergers and acquisitions have experienced a
substantial increase in recent years. Despite an important body of theoretical and
empirical work in the literature on mergers and acquisitions, the relationship between
the intertemporal consistency problem present in durable goods and the incentives for
mergers have not been studied in the literature. The implications of the analysis are
not trivial and seem relevant for public policy issues regarding antitrust policies, for
the analysis of the eﬀects of diﬀerent commercialization practices concerning durable
goods, and may also represent a valuable source for empirical work in future research.
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